Beijing is making significant progress with new airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, even as doubts grow about the survivability of such platforms in modern warfare.
No platform exemplifies China’s AEW&C efforts more than the two prototypes of the Xian KJ-3000 AEW&C aircraft. Both have made frequent appearances in the skies above Xian, suggesting that testing is well underway.
Although the KJ-3000 designation suggests a clear lineage from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF’s) KJ-2000, the new aircraft is far more advanced and is a truly indigenous aircraft. Along with platforms such as the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter, the KJ-3000 symbolises China’s progress as an aerospace power.
Entering PLAAF service in the mid-2000s, China’s four operational KJ-2000s are based on the Ilyushin Il-76 airframe and powered by four antiquated Soloviev D-30KP-2s, the same powerplant employed on early versions of the Xian Y-20 strategic transport.
For a strategic asset such as an AEW&C aircraft an older, relatively inefficient engine is a major hindrance both for endurance and electrical power generation.
The KJ-3000, in turn, is based on the Y-20B, and is powered by four Aero Engine Corporation of China WS-20s, a modern high-bypass powerplant that is understood to be related to the CJ-1000A that will eventually power the Comac C919 narrowbody airliner.
In addition to being more fuel efficient the WS-20 will likely provide far superior electrical power. Moreover, the KJ-3000 is equipped with an air-to-air refuelling probe, an endurance-enhancing feature not found on the KJ-2000.
Notably, the KJ-3000 has a rotating radar dome atop the fuselage, likely to contain a pair of active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars.
The rotating dome is something of a throwback: China’s workhorse AEW&C platform, the turboprop-powered Shaanxi KJ-500, features a fixed radar dish understood to house three fixed AESA arrays.
A fixed array would have offered higher update rates, but the rotating dome allows for a larger single-aperture antenna, maximising detection range and sensitivity against low-observable targets.
Source: Chinese social media
This hybrid approach should enable the KJ-3000 to perform 360° volume searches while retaining the ability to “stare” at specific sectors with high-energy electronic steering.
A key distinguishing feature for the KJ-3000 is the presence of what appears to be an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor above its left-wing root. This is especially visible in social media images of the second prototype, aircraft 7822.
This passive sensing capability is likely intended to detect the thermal signatures of low radar cross-section (RCS) stealth aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35. The F-35 has proliferated in the US military, as well as in the militaries of Australia, Japan and South Korea. IRST offers a useful fallback in contested environments where active radar is jammed or countered by low RCS aircraft.
The KJ-3000’s IRST sensor could also be used to help verify targets picked up by the radar and should allow the KJ-3000 to operate in a passive sensing mode, where its main array does not produce emissions.
The KJ-3000 gets a mention in the US Department of Defense’s 2025 report to Congress about Chinese military developments. The Pentagon notes that the aircraft will probably be the world’s first AEW&C platform to use digital radar, and assesses it as capable of anti-jamming, passive detection, and target identification.
These capabilities position the KJ-3000 as a central command node for China’s evolving kill-web, coordinating manned-unmanned teaming at extended ranges and optimised to detect low-observable stealth threats.
Another recent Chinese AEW&C platform is tentatively designated the KJ-700, a derivative of the Shaanxi Y-9 tactical transport.
As with the KJ-500, the aircraft appears to have a fixed, three-sided AESA array. The KJ-700 also has fairings on its rear fuselage that likely contain side-looking AESA radars, and what appears to be a satellite communications array on the top of its fixed rotodome.
Uniquely for a large AEW&C aircraft, the KJ-700 has a large electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor in its nose. Online speculation suggests that the EO/IR sensor is intended to spot missile launches and other emissions on the infrared spectrum.
A small number of KJ-700s are believed to be in service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
However impressive the KJ-700 may be, it is overshadowed by the PLAN’s Xian KJ-600, an aircraft carrier-capable AEW&C aircraft that resembles the Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye in service with the US Navy (USN).
KJ-600 prototypes have been spotted during test flights for several years. Last September, the type was featured in a series of dramatic videos showing the aircraft launching from CNS Fujian, China’s first CATOBAR (catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery) carrier, using the vessel’s electromagnetic launch system. The KJ-600 was also seen “trapping” aboard the vessel.
At least six KJ-600 prototypes are believed to be in use, with serial production likely underway. The type has a rotating radar dome housing two AESA arrays.
An advanced, carrier-based AEW&C platform such as the KJ-600 will greatly enhance situational awareness for the PLAN. If the service follows USN practice, each CATOBAR carrier will have about four KJ-600s. This will allow the PLAN to match the USN and coordinate carrier strike group kill-webs well beyond China’s shores.
The new AEW&C aircraft – the KJ-3000, KJ-700, and KJ-600 – add to Beijing’s existing fleet of KJ-500s, a type that is well observed in PLAAF service and is a regular participant in Chinese aerial incursions against neighbouring Taiwan. Indeed, the Pentagon views the KJ-500 as the PLAAF’s primary AEW&C workhorse.
The 2020s has seen the PLAAF introduce the more capable KJ-500A, which benefits from the addition of an air-to-air refuelling probe, allowing the type to receive fuel from Beijing’s growing fleet of YY-20 tankers. The KJ-500A is also believed to have better computer processing, enhanced cooling systems and better satellite fairings, as well as antennas to support the data requirements of kill-webs.
Source: Chinese social media
China is opaque about force numbers, but it is believed that some 40-45 KJ-500s are in service, with about half believed to be advanced KJ-500As.
In addition, the PLAAF still operates about a dozen Shaanxi KJ-200s that feature a “plank” radar array. While these aircraft probably do not offer the high-end kill-web capability of platforms such as the KJ-500A and KJ-3000, it is believed that they still have a role monitoring specific air corridors.
China’s manned AEW&C fleet is supported by uncrewed aircraft such as the Shenyang WZ-9 Divine Eagle, which the Pentagon’s 2025 report described as being “semi-operational” following a South China Sea deployment.
Designed for high-altitude, long-endurance operations, the WZ-9 features twin fuselages that each house AESA radars, likely optimised to detect low-RCS targets. The aircraft is effectively a high-altitude picket intended to provide real-time targeting data without risking aircrew.
Other Chinese uncrewed assets with a long-range AEW&C role include the China Electronics Technology Group JY-300, which uses conformal AESA antennas built directly into its wing leading edges and fuselage, and the Guizhou WZ-7, which is believed to provide advanced targeting data, likely feeding it back to manned AEW&C platforms as part of the kill-web.
As with the US military, Beijing is also looking to space for AEW&C coverage. According to the Pentagon, China is operationalising a ‘multi-layer sensor grid’ that begins in geostationary orbit, with the goal of setting up a persistent surveillance umbrella that links to AEW&C aircraft.
This space-to-air data link would allow airborne controllers to coordinate long-range precision strikes based on orbital hand-offs, significantly reducing the time required to close kill-chains against high-value moving targets.
Despite the promise of space, Beijing appears more committed to manned AEW&C than the USAF, which is flirting with the possible cancellation of a programme to replace the obsolescent Boeing E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) with the 737NG-derived E-7 Wedgetail. The administration of US President Donald Trump feels that the AEW&C role can be better performed by space-based assets.
There are also questions about the vulnerability of large AEW&C aircraft, particularly on the ground. The large size of the jets and their prominent radar domes make them especially difficult to conceal at air bases, particularly from satellites.
This vulnerability is not theoretical. In late March, Iranian forces were able to destroy a USAF E-3G located on a taxiway at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan air base. This offered a stark illustration of how exposed large AEW&C platforms on the ground can be. The US military has been tight-lipped about what happened, but reports suggest the base’s defences were overwhelmed by a massed strike of Shahed-136 one-way attack drones.
Should a future conflict break out between China and the USA, the Pentagon has a vast arsenal of standoff weapons to strike Chinese air bases. In addition to traditional long-range weapons such as cruise missiles, the PLA also would need to contend with growing numbers of systems such as the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS), the USA’s version of the Shahed-136.
Small explosive-laden drones can also be deployed near air bases to strike aircraft on the ground. In June 2025’s Operation Spiderweb, Ukraine used truck-launched drones to strike Russian air bases far from the front lines, destroying at least 10-13 Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers. Some estimates suggest that as many as 40 Russian aircraft were damaged in the attack. Two Beriev A-50 AEW&C aircraft are understood to have also been hit in the attack.
When airborne, Chinese AEW&C platforms will also face increasingly lethal air-to-air weapons. The USN has deployed the Raytheon AIM-174B Gunslinger missile – an air-launched version of the SM-6 surface-to-air weapon – on its Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.
With a likely range between 217-260nm (463-648km), the weapon will force Chinese surveillance assets to operate at greater distances from US aircraft carrier strike groups. Should a Chinese AEW&C aircraft come within the engagement zone of the AIM-174B, evasion by a large, slow AEW&C aircraft is essentially impossible.
China, for its part, has deployed the large PL-17 air-to-air missile on its Shenyang J-16 fighters. Estimates suggest a range between 215-270nm. A clear mission for this weapon is engaging large, high-value assets such as AEW&C aircraft and in-flight refuelling tankers.
Taken together, China’s expanding AEW&C fleet represents one of the most consequential and least-discussed dimensions of its military modernisation. From the carrier-capable KJ-600 to the high-altitude WZ-9 and the space-based sensor grid above them, Beijing is assembling a layered surveillance architecture designed to underpin kill-web operations across the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
The contrast with Washington, where the future of the E-7 remains uncertain and the appetite for manned AEW&C appears to be waning, is striking.
Yet the same vulnerabilities that now threaten US and allied AEW&C assets apply equally to China’s. Large, distinctive aircraft are hard to hide and hard to defend. The destruction of the E-3 AWACS at Prince Sultan air base, and the lessons of Kyiv’s Operation Spiderweb, will not have been lost on PLA planners.
Beijing is investing heavily in platforms that could prove decisive in a future conflict, but it also must reckon with the growing ease with which big AEW&C aircraft can be found and destroyed before they ever leave the ground.
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